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Abstract  
In this paper, we consider a static model for advertising strategies and pricing decisions in 
supply chain with one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers. We assume an 
additive form of the consumer demand which is influenced by retail price and advertising. 
The manufacturer sets the wholesale price, invests in advertising (at national level) and offers 
cooperative advertising to boost the advertising expenditures of their retailers. The retailers 
set the retail price and invest in advertising (at local level). By means of game theory, we 
discuss three different relationships between the supply chain members: two non cooperative 
games including the Stackelberg – Cournot and the Stackelberg – Collusion and one 
cooperative game. The comparison between the three models reveals that the advertising, the 
pricing, the consumer demand and the profits are affected by various relationships. 
Furthermore, under the cooperation situation, we propose a channel coordination mechanism 
through a manufacturer’s participation rate in retailers’ local advertising cost and wholesale 
price by using utility function. 
Keywords: Game theory, supply chain, cooperative advertising, pricing, retail competition, 
retail coalition, coordination mechanism.  
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1. Introduction 
Pricing
1
 and advertising decisions in a manufacturer-retailer channel gained much attention 
recently, especially when game theoretical models are used to analyze the interaction of 
different channel members. These have different advertising objectives. The manufacturer 
invests in national advertising in order to build brand equity and to promote and lure the 
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 Pricing is a core topic in the marketing research literature on supply chain including retail price and wholesale 
price.  
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potential consumers choosing its product (the long-term sales effect). Whereas, the retailer 
invests in local advertising in order to boost the local demand (the short-term sales effect).  
 
The inconsistency of two types of advertising is assumed of a sufficient magnitude to create a 
role for cooperative advertising, which is one of the most important issues in marketing 
programs and plays a significant role in the analysis of supply chain relationships. 
Cooperative advertising is defined as an interactive relationship and financial arrangement 
between the members of supply chain, in which the manufacturer shares a part of the retailer’s 
advertising expenditures - commonly known as the manufacture’s participation rate - to 
motivate immediate sales at the retail level where the retailer is not able to invest a sufficient 
sum of money in the local advertising.  
 
The stream of literature that is related to an application of game theoretical models in 
marketing channel can be divided, in general, into two main categories according to the nature 
of the model used: static models or dynamic models. Under each category, we can identify the 
structure of marketing channel (marketing channel with simple or complex structure), the 
mechanism of coordination as quantity discount, profit or revenue sharing, advertising 
allowances, local advertising cost-sharing, two-part tariffs and the game type including 
Stackelberg, Nash and cooperation.   
In static model, the relationships between supply chain members are discussed in a single 
period. In dynamic model, the interactions among supply chain members are discussed in 
continuous time as differential games or optimal control problems.  
In the following, we summarize the papers that refer only to the first category because our 
study focuses on the static models. The papers of second category have some assumptions in 
common: they employed the advertising goodwill model of Nerlove and Arrow (1962) as a 
description of the dynamics of the game. Examples in this category are Jorgensen et al. (2000, 
2001a), Jorgensen and Zaccour (2004), He et al. (2011, 2012), Zhang et al. (2013) and 
Chutani and Sethi (2012b, 2014).  
The papers, that have adopted static models, are divided into two main parts where the first 
one deals with classical marketing channel having one manufacturer – one retailer. The 
second one deals with more than one manufacturer – one retailer.  Berger (1972) was the first 
person to propose a primary static model analyzing the cooperative advertising in a marketing 
channel. He concluded that offering an advertising allowance to the retailer by manufacturer 
can generate higher profits. Following this research, several authors have addressed this 
concept by different point of view (see. Crimmins (1985), Berger and Magliozzi (1992), Dant 
and Berger (1996), Kim and Staelin (1999), Nagler (2006)). 
Most studies included in the current review mainly focused on the first part (single 
manufacturer – single retailer framework). Xie and Ai (2006) extended the paper of Li et al. 
(2002) who have developed a new game structure called “higher order Stackelberg” 
equilibrium. The authors considered a model with non linear demand and developed three 
strategic models for determining equilibrium marketing and investment effort levels.  
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Furthermore, they compared the results with those of the paper of Huang and Li (2001) which 
are different. Yue et al. (2006) extended the model of Huang et al. (2002). They studied the 
coordination of cooperative advertising when the manufacturer offers price deductions to 
customers. The novelty in this paper is that these authors highlighted the problem of negative 
demand for certain values of the decisions variables. They suggested two constraints to fix it, 
but they did not incorporate these constraints into their mathematical analysis. These authors 
found out that if the upstream and downstream firms cooperate, they achieve cooperative 
advertising. They showed that, on a cooperative model, the total profit of the supply chain is 
higher than without cooperation. The constraints suggested by Yue et al. (2006) 
had been taken into account by Ahmadi-Javid and Hoseinpour (2011). They corrected the 
demand function of Huang and Li (2001), Huang et al. (2002), Li et al. (2002), Xie and Ai 
(2006) and Yue et al. (2006). 
All the paper mentioned before examine a static game theoretic model for cooperative 
advertising in supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. There are 
many researches, which have received considerable attention recently, study the same model 
described earlier and assume that the market demand is influenced by both advertising and 
pricing. Xie and Wei (2009) considered two game models including a non cooperative game 
(the Stackelberg-manufacturer) and a cooperative game and then compared between them. 
They showed that cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher 
channel total profits, lower retail price to consumers, and higher advertising efforts for all 
channel members than the non-cooperative model. They identified the feasible solutions to a 
bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra-profits 
generated by cooperation. Xie and Neyret (2009) followed a similar approach and 
investigated four games models (cooperative game, Nash game, Stackelberg-Manufacturer 
and Stackelberg-Retailer) to analyze a cooperative advertising in two-tier marketing channel. 
Szamerkovsky and Zhang (2009) considered pricing and advertising decisions in a two 
member supply chain, where costumer demand depends on both retail price and 
advertisement. They obtained the optimal decisions of each member by solving a Stackelberg 
game with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. The authors proved 
that the participation rate of local advertising does not work well, it is better for the 
manufacturer to advertise nationally and offer the retailer a lower wholesale price.  
Further, Seyed Esfahani et al. (2011) discuss the cooperative and non-cooperative game 
between a manufacturer and a retailer. They introduce a slight modification in the linear price 
demand function by assuming a relatively general form compared with the classical linear 
relationship: they introduce a new parameter   which yields convex        , linear       
and concave         curves. Aust and Busher (2012) extend the work of Seyed Esfahani et 
al. (2011). They add a retailer margin “ ”         as a new decision variable according 
to Choi (1991, 1996). The aim of this modification is to get better idea into the effects of 
market power on the distribution of channels profits. They prove that both the manufacture 
and the retailer achieve the highest profits level when they cooperate.   
In order to follow this research approach and to relax the classical marketing channel having 
one manufacturer – one retailer, some studies suggested adding competition, whether between 
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manufacturers or between retailers to enrich the model used. Karray and Zaccour (2007) 
considered a supply chain formed by two manufacturer and two retailers. The retailers choose 
their levels of marketing efforts and the manufacturer control their participation rates. The 
authors assumed that the national advertising efforts are exogenous parameters instead of 
manufacturer’s decisions variables. Wang et al. (2011) and Zhang and Xie (2012) consider a 
supply chain in which a monopolistic manufacturer sells its product through duopolistic 
retailers. They assume that the demand function depends only on local and national 
advertising: they suppose prices as constant parameters.  The paper of Wang et al. (2011) 
discusses four possible game structures: Stackelberg - Cournot, Stackelberg - Collusion, Nash 
- Cournot and Nash - collusion. The authors reveal how cooperative advertising policies and 
profits of all participants are affected by various competitive behaviors. However, all their 
results are made under the heavy assumption that the retailers and the manufacturer’s 
marginal profits are exogenously determined. However, the paper of Zhang and Xie (2012) 
explore the impacts of the retailer’s multiplicity on channel members’ optimal decisions and 
on the total channel efficiency. Ben Youssef and Dridi (2013) propose a supply channel 
composed of one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers where the demand function is 
dependent on pricing and national advertising. Three game theoretic models are established 
including the non cooperative game, the partial cooperative game and the full cooperation 
game. In addition, the authors suggest a new and unusual evaluation of consumers’ surplus 
which positively depends not only on the price-demand function but also on the spending in 
national advertising. For more details, one can refer to the papers of Jorgensen S. and Zaccour 
G. (2013) and Aust G. and Busher U. (2014). These papers surveyed the literature on 
cooperative advertising in marketing channels using game theoretic models. 
Our main motivation is the scarcity of researches that develops game theoretical models with 
multiple retailers because the assumption of multiple retailers is more realistic. 
According to our best knowledge, only the papers of Alirezai and KhoshAlhan (2014) and of 
Karray and Amin (2014) that addressed to study pricing and cooperative advertising at the 
same time in supply chain formed by monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailer. 
Alirezai and KhoshAlhan (2014) adopt a multiplicative form of demand function of Aust and 
Busher (2012) with some simplifications. They consider that the local advertising of each 
retailer has a negative effect on the other retailer and use the Nash, Manufacturer – 
Stackelberg and cooperative games for this investigation. Karray and Amin (2014) evaluate 
the profitability of cooperative advertising in a channel with competing retailers. In this work, 
the authors proposed the retail price and the local advertising expenditures as decision 
variables of retailers and the coop participation rate and the wholesale price as decision 
variables of manufacturer. But, they ignored the national advertising expenditures (decision 
variable of manufacturer).  They assumed a demand function that has been commonly used in 
the literature by McGuire and Staelin (1983), Choi (1991), Karray and Zaccour (2006) and 
Karray (2013). This demand function is positively influenced by his local advertising and 
negatively affected by the local advertising of his competitor. The authors developed two non-
cooperative games (one is without cooperative advertising and another is with cooperative 
advertising) and a cooperative game and they provided equilibrium solutions for each game. 
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In our paper, we intend to study pricing and advertising decisions in one manufacturer – two 
competing retailers marketing channel using game theoretic models (Stackelberg – Cournot, 
Stackelberg – Collusion and cooperation) in order to explore the impacts of retail competition, 
retail coalition and cooperative on the channel members’ decisions, the profit of each 
member, the surplus consumers and the social welfare. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section   first introduces the basic model. The 
game theoretic analysis is addressed in section  . Comparisons between three different game 
theoretic structures are made in section  . Finally, our conclusions are shown in section  .   
2. The basic model 
To model the relationship between monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers, we 
consider cooperative advertising issues of a supply chain in which both retailers sell only the 
manufacturer’s product. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price and invests in national 
advertising in order to create brand awareness and to increase consumer’s interest for the 
product. In addition, the manufacturer utilizes the cooperative advertising programs by 
sharing a part of retailers’ advertising costs in the hope for stimulating potential consumers’. 
On the other hand, each retailer decides on a retail price and invests also in the local 
advertising. 
Unlike the existing research related to this issue, our paper suggest an additive form of 
demand function which is influenced by advertising expenditures and retail price. We 
likewise assume, as in Lal (1990) and Wang et al. (2009), that the local advertising effort not 
only benefits the investing retailer but also the other competing retailer located in close 
physical proximity. The consumer demand function    for the product proposed by retailer   
depends on the retail prices and the advertising level as: 
                                  
 
    
where    is a positive constant and denotes the maximal potential demand faced by retailer   if 
prices and advertising expenditures are zero. In the game theoretic analysis, we assume 
     to simplify the expressions; 
   is the sale price charged by retailer    to consumer; 
        is the local advertising expenditure of retailer      ; 
  is the effectiveness of compete retailer’s local advertising (      ; 
  is the manufacturer’s national advertising expenditures.  
In Eq.  , we assume that the demand function is not affected by competitor’s price because 
the retailers’ prices are often the same when the retailers are geographically related. 
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Furthermore, the retailers will set identical prices for the reason that they face the same 
demand function
2
.  
The profit of each retailer, the manufacturer, the two retailers and the total system can be 
expressed as follows, respectively: 
                    
  
 
    
       
     
     
 
     
    
 
    
       
     
 
 
    
                
     
 
 
    
where   is the manufacturer’s wholesale price         3.   is the manufacture’s 
participation rate in retailers’ local advertising expenditures        .  
In the previous equations, the local advertising expenditures are quadratic as incremental 
investments in brand-specific service become increasingly costly. Wang et al (2009) note that 
assuming cost      in the previous equations is equivalent to assuming diminishing returns 
to local advertising expenditures     . Moreover, the national advertising expenditures are 
equal to    as with local advertising expenditures. 
In addition, our important contribution in this paper is the evaluation of the impact of retail 
competition, retail coalition and cooperation between all members of the supply chain on 
consumer surplus and social welfare. The consumer surplus engendered by the consumption 
of quantity    of the product sold by retailer   is:  
                    
  
 
   
 
    
 
From    , we have: 
                                     
 
Using     in    , we get: 
        
 
 
  
  
    
                                                             
2
 In Eq. (14), we will prove that      . For more details, one can see the paper of Wang et al (2009). 
3
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The above expression is a new evaluation of consumer surplus because it not only depends on 
pricing but also related to the local and the national advertising expenditures.  
The total of consumer surplus engendered by the consumption of the two products is:  
                         
 
Then, we define the social welfare as the sum of the total of consumer surplus and the total 
profit of the supply chain: 
              
  
3. Game theoretic analysis 
In this section we discus three game theoretic models based on two non cooperative games 
including Stachelberg – Cournot and Stachelberg – Collusion  and one cooperative game. 
3.1 The Stackelberg – Cournot game 
We assume a relationship among the manufacturer and the retailers when the manufacturer is 
the leader and the two retailers are followers. At the retail level, we consider that the retailers 
simultaneously and non-cooperatively maximize their own profits (retailers acting 
independently).  
To determine the equilibrium of the Stackelberg - Cournot game, we firstly solve the 
optimization problem of retailer  . That is: 
                        
  
 
                    and     . 
     
 
To solve these optimization problems, each retailer take the first derivative of formulas 
described above with respect to    and    as following: 
 
    
   
                      
     
    
   
                  
     
 
Solving these equations and substituting the algebraic expressions yield to the following 
retailers’ decision variables: 
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Integrating      and      with    , we can get the manufacturer’s optimization problem as 
follows: 
      
                
      
 
           
         
    
                and      
     
 
Taking the first derivatives of formula      with respect to  ,   and  . Let 
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
  , we can get the following expressions after substitution:  
  
                       
                     
 
 
     
 
  
                   
           
 
 
     
 
  
     
          
 
 
     
 
Proposition  : the Stackelberg - Cournot game previously described has the following 
unique equilibrium solution that is given with the parameter            : 
   
     
          
 
 
     
 
   
 
          
 
 
     
 
   
    
    
 
 
     
 
   
     
          
 
 
     
 
   
       
          
 
Proposition   prove that the retailers set identical prices and local advertising 
expenditures as we mentioned earlier. The second order conditions prove that the 
manufacture’s advertising participation rate must be between   and 
 
 
 (See Appendix 
for the proof of the second order condition). 
     
 
 
3.2 The Stackelberg – Collusion game 
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Under the Stackelberg – Collusion game, the leader is still the monopolistic manufacturer 
who acts as the first mover by choosing the wholesale price, the national advertising and the 
participation rate of cooperative advertising expenditures (the first stage of game). The two 
duopolistic retailers, acting as the followers, then make decisions together to maximize jointly 
their profits by choosing the retail prices and the local advertising expenditures (the second 
stage of game).  
First, we analyze the retailers’ optimal pricing and advertising, in the second stage of the 
game. The joint profit function of the two retailers can be expressed as:  
                                 
                        
               
                                                                                                                          
To maximize this joint profit function, one can easily solve the retailers’ decision problem by 
equating the first partial derivatives, with respect to    and   , to zero and taking the 
manufacturer's decision variables as constants. 
   
   
                    
 
     
 
   
   
                         
 
     
 
From these equations and after substitution, we obtain the optimal symmetric solutions of the 
retail price and the local advertisement as shown: 
   
                         
          
 
 
     
 
    
            
          
 
 
     
 
Second, as a leader, the manufacturer knows the retailers’ reaction functions given in      
and      before setting  ,  ,   (the first stage of the game). So, the manufacturer’s profit 
function for any  ,   and   can be formulated by substituting      and      into     as: 
   
               
          
 
                
             
    
     
 
 
Solving 
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
   and substituting lead us to the optimal expressions shown 
below: 
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Proposition  : The Stackelberg equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg - Collusion game is 
unique and is given by: 
   
       
        
 
     
 
  
      
        
 
     
 
   
 
          
 
     
 
   
 
 
 
     
 
  
         
          
 
 
     
 
From this proposition, we observe that the decision variables depend on   expect the 
participation rate which is unaffected of competitor’s advertising.   must take any value 
between   and     . (See Appendix for proof of proposition  ). 
3.3  The cooperation game 
In this subsection, we focus on a cooperative game structure. Under this situation, the 
monopolistic manufacturer and the two duopolistic retailers agree to make decisions in order 
to optimize the whole supply chain’s profit. These decisions include the optimal retail price, 
the optimal local and national advertising expenditures. The maximization problem for the 
supply chain under the cooperation situation is:  
         
                 
                   
    
     
 
                             
 
 
     
We observe that the objective function does not depend on the wholesale price and the 
participation rate of local advertisement. However, the individual profit of each supply chain 
member is dependent of these variables. To solve this optimization problem, we determine the 
five first derivatives and then equate to zero as follows: 
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From     ,     , and     , we derive the following expressions: 
   
 
 
             
 
     
   
 
 
         
 
     
  
 
 
        
 
     
Proposition  : Cooperation between a monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers 
has the objective to maximize its joint profit which reaches its maximum at the following 
equilibrium: 
   
 
       
 
 
     
  
   
       
 
 
     
   
 
       
 
     
 
In the cooperation situation, the local advertising expense of each retailer is less than the 
national advertising expense. By checking the second-order conditions, the parameter    can 
take either value between   and     . (See Appendix for proof of proposition  ). 
4. The results and discussion 
In this section, we discuss whether the manufacturer and the retailers would be better off in 
the cooperation than in the Cournot and Collusion. We derive the differences between the 
optimal decision variables and the profits in the three games and then we compare between 
them to develop some managerial guidelines.   
Finally, we discuss the question of how the monopolistic manufacturer and the two 
duopolistic retailers should share the savings that the cooperation offers their members.  
4.1 Comparison of results  
In the table 1, we summarize the optimal decision variables of wholesale and retail prices, the 
national and local advertising expenditures and the participation rate founded earlier of three 
games. We also determine the demand function, the profit of each supply chain member and 
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the overall profit of the system of the three games in Table  . Given the difficulty of 
comparing the results analytically, we resort to explanatory schemas. 
Table  : Optimal expressions in each game 
  
Stackelberg - Cournot 
 
 
Stackelberg - Collusion 
 
Cooperation 
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From the figures    ,    ,    ,     and    , we derive the following proposition: 
Proposition  : 
i.        
ii.         
iii.           
  
iv.          
v.         
  
The results demonstrate that the different behaviors of the supply chain’s members make the 
manufacturer and the two retailers set different decisions variables. As shown in     and     , 
we observe that the manufacturer declares a highest wholesale price and reduces the 
participation rate of retailers’ advertising expenditures when the two retailers cooperate. Fig. 
  shows that the manufacture’s advertising participation rate does not exceed    . 
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From      , the highest retail price can be found in the cooperation, while the Stackelberg - 
Cournot yields the lowest retail price. This result is new and surprise as because the previous 
analysis prove that the cooperation between all members of supply chain produces the lowest 
retail price. Under Stakelberg – Collusion (comparing with Stackleberg – Cournot), the two 
retailers charge a higher retail price as the manufacturer declares a higher wholesale price. 
This situation is not favorable for the consumers (the competition between retailers is 
favorable for consumers as it generates a lower retail price). 
Furthermore, one can see that the manufacturer can benefit from the cooperation between 
retailers as he is able to set a higher wholesale price.  
From      and    , each member of supply chain invests more in advertising if they cooperate 
and maximize the whole profit together. When the manufacturer is the leader, the duopolistic 
retailers spend more on local advertising under Stackelberg - Collusion game due to the 
diminishing of the manufacturer’s participation rate.  
Table  : Demand function and profits 
  
Stackelberg - 
Cournot 
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Cooperation 
 
   
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
       
 
 
    
 
       
             
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
                             
          
 
 
   
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
                          
          
 
 
   
 
             
             
 
 
 
  
           
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
    
 
 
  
             
 
 
  
             
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
   
 
             
             
 
 
 
 
 
          
           
 
 
          
          
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the figures    ,    ,     and    , we reveal the following proposition: 
Proposition  : 
i.            
ii.         
    
iii.       
   
iv.            
  
As we mentioned earlier that the retail price increases under a Cooperation strategy, the 
demand does not decrease. So, an increase in retail price does not necessarily lead to a 
decrease in sales. This is largely explained by spending more money on national and local 
advertising. 
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 When the manufacture is a leader and the two retailers pursue collusive strategy, the quantity 
demanded increases even though the retail price is high. Our research proves that, as the two 
retailers collude and maximize the joint profit together, they gain more profits.  
The manufacture, as a leader, prefers that the duopolistic retailers act together rather than act 
separately for the reason that the manufacturer’s profit is the higher under the Stackelberg - 
Collusion than the Stackelberg - Cournot. 
Proposition        is consistent with the well-known result of the literature: the supply 
chain members agree to take decisions together (to cooperate) in order to maximize the entire 
channel’s profit only if they cannot get any higher profits in any other strategies. In this 
cooperation strategy, the members will develop a coordination mechanism to share the extra-
profits
4
 by finding (    . This issue is addressed in the next subsection as channel 
coordination mechanism through sharing local advertising    and wholesale price  . 
Proposition  : 
i.                
 
 5 
ii.                  
In our research, we provide a new evaluation of the consumer surplus and social welfare that 
depend on retail pricing, local advertising and national advertising. Retail competition reduces 
the consumer surplus and social welfare. Nevertheless, the cooperation between all members 
of supply chain increases them. 
4.2 Channel coordination  mechanism through the manufacturer’s participation 
rate in retailers’ local advertising costs and wholesale price 
Neither the monopolistic manufacturer nor the duopolistic retailers would be willing to 
cooperate if their individual profit is lower than those in a non-cooperative game. We assume 
that the members of supply chain accept the strongly feasible solution             .  
The manufacturer agrees to cooperate only if following condition is satisfied: 
                      
                                         
 
     
And the duopolistic retailers cooperate only if following condition is satisfied: 
                       
                                                         
 
     
Summing up      and     , equivalently we have: 
                                
 
     
                                                             
4 The increased profit gain from the cooperation strategy.  
5       
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If the channel members commit to a cooperative program, they will split the extra-profits 
according to this bargaining problem: 
             
 
                
 
           
 
       
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
where     and      are the extra-profits that can be made by manufacturer and retailer 
          respectively and evidently verify                  . 
To find a suitable division of funds between the three partners, we use the approach of Nash 
bargaining model (Nash, 1950) using a power utility functions of type        6.  
 
We can formulate the Nash bargaining model by: 
 
          
            
             
    
 
     
where   ,     and     are positive parameters reflecting each member’s bargaining power 
and verifying   +         . Next, we derive the following optimization problem: 
         
        
           
       
 
                                               
 
 
 
     
where   ,     and     are positive parameters denoting the risk attitudes of the manufacturer 
and the two retailers.      
Proposition  : The Nash bargaining model leads to the following division of profits: 
    
    
                  
    
 
     
     
      
                  
    
 
     
     
      
                  
    
 
     
After determining    ,      and     ,  the manufacturer and the two retailers can prepare 
themselves to make good decisions about   ant   .  
From     , we derive respectively: 
                                                             
6 Another possible utility function is the exponential function                  
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That is to say, the three partners can coordinate the supply chain if the wholesale price 
satisfies the next proposition. 
Proposition  : The monopolistic manufacturer and the duopolistic retailers adopt the 
cooperative strategy if and only if the wholesale should be between a minimal value and a 
maximal value as described below: 
      
                           
          
   
 
 
 
      
                      
          
 
 
For each           . 
 
 
 
     
Still from     , we rewrite: 
            
                             
         
           
 
     
Proposition  : The manufacture’s participation rate for local advertising expenditures is: 
   
 
 
 
         
 
              
         
         
 
     
 
5. Conclusion 
Our paper investigated a static model for cooperative advertising and pricing decisions in 
supply chain with one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers. Cooperative 
advertising has attracted much attention in the academic field and has been widely used in 
practice as a significant marketing tool that influences the advertising activities and pricing 
policies in supply chain. 
This research is motivated by the scarcity of studies that discussed a marketing channel where 
a single manufacturer sells its product through two competing retailers. In other words, we 
want to relax the classical one manufacturer one retailer framework to one manufacture two 
retailers framework (the supply chain becomes more pragmatic). Also, the little research 
which deals with one manufacturer two retailers does not take pricing decisions into account 
directly. For this reason, we propose an additive form of a demand function which is 
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influenced by advertising expenditures and retail price. We likewise assume that the local 
advertising effort not only benefits the investing retailer but also the other competing retailer 
located in close physical proximity. The novelty here is that we used an additive form of 
demand function.  
To develop optimal cooperative advertising strategies and pricing decisions, we develop three 
games including the Stackelberg – Cournot game (retail competition), the the Stackelberg – 
Collusion game (retail coalition) and the cooperative game (cooperation of the manufacturer 
and the two retailers). Through a comparison between them, we obtain the following insights:  
   All decision variables (except   ), the demand and the profits  in three games depend on the 
effectiveness of compete retailer’s local advertising    . Our research indicates that   must be 
between   and     . Also as it increases, the variables decisions, the demand and the profits 
increase.  
   Retail competition offers the best price to the consumer, but requires the manufacturer to 
reduce its participation rate in local advertising expenditures. Under the retail competition, the 
wholesale price, all advertising, the consumer demand, the profit of each member as well as 
the total profit, the consumer surplus and the social profit are lower than under retail coalition.  
   The highest total profit and the highest local and national advertising expenditures are 
generated under the cooperation. Although this situation produces the highest retail price and 
the highest consumer demand. In addition, the surplus consumer and the social welfare 
increase.  
For future researches, there are several possible directions. First, while our model assumes the 
manufacturer to be Stackelberg leader, one can consider that the retailers have the real 
channel power to dictate the terms to the manufacturer (the retailers are the Stackelberg 
leaders).  Second, the demand function proposed in this paper is a deterministic in nature; 
uncertain demand seems to be an interesting topic for future research.  
Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition  .  
. Solving the first partial derivatives of the profit function of each retailer yields to the 
following expressions: 
   
 
 
               
   
 
 
 
    
   
 
After substitution, we get the solutions of equations      and     . 
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To proof the second order conditions of the solutions of retailer  , we calculate the Hessian 
matrix: 
  
 
 
 
     
   
 
     
      
     
      
     
   
 
 
 
 
 
The second order partial derivatives are as follows: 
     
   
                                  
     
   
                                
     
      
    
The first principal minor of   is negative (  ). The second principal minor of   is:    
     
   
  
     
   
   
     
      
           is positive if   
 
 
. This means that the profit function of 
each retailer     is concave at the solution   
     , which is a local maximum. 
. The first derivatives of formula      with respect to  ,   and   are: 
   
  
 
        
      
 
          
         
       
   
  
 
          
      
 
                 
         
 
          
         
  
            
         
   
   
  
  
        
      
 
               
      
 
          
         
   
After substitution and algebraic simplification, we obtain the solutions of equations     , 
     and     . 
To proof the second order conditions of the solutions of manufacturer, we have the following 
Hessian matrix: 
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The first principal minor of   is     
                    
           
 and is negative. The second 
principal minor of   is     
       
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
                        
 and is positive. The third principal 
minor of   is    
      
 
 
  
                       
 is negative if             . That means 
           and H is negative definite. So, the manufacturer’s profit function    is concave 
at the solution           , which is a local maximum. 
This completes the proof of Proposition  . 
Proof of Proposition  .  
. Solving the first partial derivatives of the joint retailers’ profit function yields to the 
following expressions: 
   
 
 
               
   
 
 
 
            
   
 
After substitution and algebraic simplification, we obtain the solutions of equations      and 
    . 
To proof the second order conditions of the solutions of two retailers, we calculate the 
following Hessian matrix: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
    
    
      
  
    
      
   
    
      
 
    
      
  
    
   
     
    
      
     
    
      
    
      
   
    
      
    
    
   
     
    
      
 
    
      
   
    
      
    
    
      
   
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first principal minor of   is       is negative. The second principal minor of   is 
     and is positive. The third principal minor of   is        
  
 
 and is negative. The 
fourth principal minor of   is    
 
 
                     and is positive if 
          . So, the principal minors of   have alternating algebraic signs at the solution 
      . This means that   is negative definite and the profit of both retailers    is concave at 
this solution, which is a local maximum.  
. The three first partial derivatives of the manufacturer’s profit function are: 
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After substitution and algebraic simplification, we find the solutions of equations     ,      
and     . 
To proof the optimality of the solutions of manufacturer under the Stackelberg- Collusion 
game, we calculate the Hessian matrix as shown in proof of proposition 1 and we found: 
The first principal minor of   is     
        
           
   is negative. The second principal 
minor of   is     
                     
           
 and is positive if           . The third 
principal minor of   is    
         
           
 and is negative if           . So, the principal 
minors of   have alternating algebraic signs at the solution          . This means that   is 
negative definite and the profit of manufacturer    is concave at this solution, which is a 
local maximum. 
This completes the proof of Proposition  . 
Proof of proposition  . 
To proof the second order conditiond of the solutions of supply chain members, we calculate 
the following Hessian matrix: 
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The first principal minor of   is       is negative. The second principal minor of   is 
     and is positive. The third principal minor of   is          and is negative. The 
fourth principal minor of   is                          and is positive. The fifth 
principal minor of   is                          and is negative if   
        . So, the principal minors of   have alternating algebraic signs at the solution 
        . This means that   is negative definite and the profit of the entire supply chain    is 
concave at this solution, which is a local maximum. 
This completes the proof of Proposition  . 
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